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approach takes into account asymmetric punishment effect and allows to discuss the
design of leniency programs in the setting with asymmetries. The main contribution
of the paper is that we consider heterogeneous firms. This heterogeneity results in
additional costs in case of disclosure of the cartel, which are caused by asymmetric
punishments. Next, following current antitrust rules, we analyze effects of the
strictness of leniency programs, which reflects the likelihood of getting a complete
exemption from fine even in case many firms self-report simultaneously. Our main
conclusion is that leniency programs work better for small companies, since a lower
rate of law enforcement is needed in order to induce self-reporting by smaller firms,
while big firms are less likely to start a cartel in the first place given the possibility
of self-reporting in future. Finally, we analyze optimal enforcement strategies of the
antitrust authority and conclude that the authority with limited resources should
implement more generous leniency rules the more cartelized the economy is.
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1 Introduction
Current antitrust enforcement in the US and the EC includes leniency programs as
one of the key ingredients, see US Department of Justice (1993, 2008) and EC
(2006a). Leniency programs grant total or partial immunity from fines to firms
collaborating with the antitrust authority by revealing information about existing
cartels. This information may be revealed ex-ante before an investigation starts or
ex-post during an ongoing investigation. Leniency programs are based on the
economic principle that firms, who broke the antitrust law, might report their illegal
activities if given proper incentives. In the US, antitrust policy specifies (reduced)
fines that are related to the illegal gain and caught cartel members regularly face
additional liabilities in the form of private law suites by harmed customers. The EC
legislation still has penalties that are proportional to the total annual turnover, which
approximates illegal gains in case they are difficult to estimate. Even though it is
legally possible in EU countries, private lawsuits are very seldom.
There is some empirical evidence in favor of the modification of the US leniency
program in 1993 (see DOJ 1998; Miller 2009). However, theoretical literature has
already noted possible negative effects on the expected number of requests for
leniency when leniency programs are wrongly designed (see, for example, Motta
and Polo 2003; Spagnolo 2004; Ellis and Wilson 2003). We add to this literature a
specific notion: companies have different size and operate in several different
markets. This heterogeneity triggers asymmetric punishments for different cartel
members after conviction. The innovation of our paper is that we present a game
theoretical model that takes into account asymmetric punishment effect and discuss
the design of leniency programs in the setting with asymmetries.
The problem of how to treat firms if they applied for leniency almost
simultaneously or if both applicants provided important information without which
case could not be successfully solved has also been raised in recent antitrust
practice. These questions are closely related to the issue of asymmetry. Only with
asymmetric players one can distinguish between the first and the second reporter.
Consequently, in this paper, we study the situation, where the leniency policy of
antitrust authority is not only limited to the option of fine reduction for self-
reporting firms but also allows different treatment of the first and the second
reporter, depending on the environment.1 This possibility is imbedded in the current
leniency rules of many competition authorities worldwide, but has not been
endogenized in theoretical models of leniency so far.
Since, in general, the leniency rules only offer a reduction in the fine calculated
on the basis of the affected turnover, but do not take into account other expected
costs of admitting illegal behavior that can potentially outweigh the fine, one can
question the effect that may be expected from the leniency rules. In general, firms
have different size and operate in several different markets. However, they may
form a cartel only in some markets. This gives a rise to additional costs in case of
disclosure of the cartel caused by an asymmetric punishment effect. When penalty is
1 For example, US leniency guidelines allow fine reductions strictly for the first reporter. While EU
leniency rules offer also partial reduction to the second reporter. See also Table 5 in ‘‘Appendix 5’’.
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proportional to overall turnover of the company, firms of different size participating
in the same cartel agreement will pay different fines.2 This effect is asymmetric for
firms that are diversified to different extends: that is the smaller is the percentage of
turnover in the markets covered by the cartel in relation to total turnover of a firm,
the bigger the asymmetric punishment effect is. The same modeling framework can
be applied to the case of international cartels, where firms that form a cartel are
based in different countries and, consequently, will be subject to different
punishment procedures. The important example of this asymmetry concerns
international cartels of European and US firms.3 In this situation, due to the fact that
in US consumers engage in private law suits more often than in Europe, the actual
penalty for the US firm would be greater than for the European firm in case a cartel
is discovered and information about its existence becomes public. Hence, following
the terminology introduced in this paper, US firms are subject to higher asymmetric
punishment effect, i.e., they suffer higher costs other than fines in case of disclosure
of cartel.
There is an interesting observation from practical antitrust enforcement that some
antitrust authorities even employed different (more lenient) format of leniency
programs when they were just introduced. For example, the Swiss antitrust authority
gave a guaranty of complete or partial exemption to all self-reporting firms in 2004
when leniency program in Switzerland was just introduced and increased the
strictness of leniency program later on.4 This case suggests that a view by antitrust
authorities that leniency programs could be designed differently for different
circumstances and different industries (markets). Meaning, in potentially highly
cartelized markets, leniency programs should be more lenient and in the markets
where cartel formation is less likely they should be more strict. Or, in other words,
different rules could be implemented in the countries where leniency programs were
just introduced and in the countries that have already long experience practicing
leniency programs.
Therefore, there is a need to extend the economic literature on antitrust and
leniency programs to take into account both asymmetric punishment effect and
structural features of the market when designing and implementing rules of leniency
programs. Addressing this problem is the main objective of the paper. But first we
provide a review of the related literature.
Malik (1993), Kaplow and Shavell (1994), and Innes (1999) were the first to
identify the potential benefits of schemes, which elicit self-reporting by violators, in
a very general setting. They conclude that self-reporting may reduce enforcement
costs and improve risk-sharing, as risk-averse self-reporting individuals face a
certain penalty rather than the stochastic penalty faced by non-reporting violators.
2 It should be noticed that fines imposed according to current EC guidelines (see EC 2006b), which are
limited by the amount of 10% of the total annual turnover of the company, also imply asymmetric
punishments. For more details see ‘‘Appendix 5’’ or Wehmhorner (2005).
3 An example of the UCAR international cartel is provided below and it is shown that actual punishments
for similar cartel members after the conviction were indeed asymmetric due to the reasons discussed
above.
4 For a more detailed description of the system implemented in Switzerland see the website of Swiss
Competition Commission, more specifically, http://www.weko.admin.ch/imperia/md/images/weko/46.pdf.
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They consider individual violators rather than a group of violators. In antitrust
applications group, violations are analyzed. In that case, introducing an opportunity
for whistle-blowing rewarded by fine reduction or even exemption changes, the
game played between the antitrust authority and the group of firms. Intuitively, this
opportunity should reduce cartel stability by increasing the incentives for firms to
reveal the cartel. This conclusion is well established in the literature (see Motta and
Polo 2003). However, in the presence of heterogeneity, these incentives change. It is
intuitively clear that due to the possibility of asymmetric punishments after a
conviction, the cartel members’ incentives to deviate and report are also
asymmetric. In particular, we will show that the effectiveness of leniency programs
is different for different types of companies and depends crucially on the external
factors (such as different legal cultures and willingness of consumers to engage in
treble damage suits or a number of markets in which a firm operates relative to the
number of markets covered by the cartel) if one takes into account asymmetric
punishment effect.
Optimal implementation of antitrust policy and leniency programs for cartel
enforcement have been analyzed in, e.g., Motta and Polo (2003), Rey (2003), Fees
and Walzl (2003), Spagnolo (2004), Motchenkova (2004), Hinloopen (2003, 2006),
Chen and Harrington (2007), Chen and Rey (2007), and Harrington (2008). Motta
and Polo (2003) show that such programs might have an important role in the
prosecution of cartels provided that firms can apply for leniency after an
investigation has started. They conclude that, if given the possibility to apply for
leniency, a firm might well decide to give up its participation in the cartel in the first
place. They find also that leniency saves resources for the authority. Finally, their
formal analysis shows that leniency should only be used when the antitrust authority
has limited resources, so that a leniency program is not unambiguously optimal.
Later, paper by Spagnolo (2004) concludes that courageous leniency programs are
closest to the optimal. Spagnolo (2004) uses a game theoretical model to relate a
first best ‘‘courageous’’ leniency scheme to a ‘‘moderate’’ leniency scheme to a
benchmark case of traditional law enforcement. The courageous program is one in
which the reporting party is actually rewarded with a part of the fine paid by the
other parties besides receiving amnesty.
Contribution by Feess and Walzl (2003) is one of the few that analyze the effects
of leniency programs taking into account heterogeneity of firms. They compare
leniency programs in the EU and the US. For that purpose, they construct a stage
game with two self-reporting stages, heterogeneous firms with respect to the amount
of evidence provided, and ex-post asymmetric information. Differences in leniency
programs in the US and Europe include the fine reduction granted for first and
second self-reporters, the role of the amount of evidence provided, and the impact of
whether the case is already under investigation. The paper by Feess and Walzl
(2003) elaborates on the role of asymmetric information to derive the optimal
degree of leniency and uses these findings to compare the programs in the US and
the EU. The important conclusion of this paper is that any leniency program that
does not pay attention to asymmetries between firms leads to a suboptimal cartel
deterrence.
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Our paper contributes to the discussed literature on leniency programs by
capturing heterogeneity of firms through asymmetric punishment effect. We analyze
a situation when a conviction by a competition authority may result in costs other
than the fine that are asymmetric. The additional asymmetric costs we will single
out are the cost associated with the fact that penalty is calculated on the basis of
overall annual turnover of the company and is not restricted to the pure illegal gains
in the market corrupted by the cartel agreement. This, what we call asymmetric
punishment effect, depends on the size of the firms. The effectiveness of a leniency
program largely depends on markets outside the market corrupted by the cartel
agreement. This framework is also applicable for analysis of international cartels,
where firms are subject to different punishment procedures according to the laws of
their countries, or in situations where, following an application for leniency, firms
are subject to costs other than the fine itself and where these costs depend on
individual characteristics of the firm.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides formal description of
the model. In Sect. 3, we solve the model and find subgame perfect equilibrium of
the game. Section 4 outlines the optimal enforcement strategies of the authority and
strategies that allow to implement the competitive outcome. Section 5 concludes the
analysis. In the appendix, we provide comparative analysis of leniency programs in
the US and the EC and proofs of the main results.
2 The model
We consider a group of firms, which may form a cartel, taking into account the
enforcement activity of the antitrust authority. The antitrust authority commits to a
certain enforcement policy, which uses leniency programs. Leniency programs
grant either complete or partial reduction of fines to the firms, which reveal the
existence of a cartel to the antitrust authority. The main innovation of this model,
compared to the earlier papers on leniency by Motta and Polo (2003) or Spagnolo
(2004), is that we consider heterogeneous firms that have different size and operate
in several different markets, but form a cartel in one of the markets. This gives rise
to additional costs in case of disclosure of cartel that are caused by an asymmetric
punishment effect. This effect can be quantified as follows: firm 1 bears additional
costs of Rh1, while firm 2 suffers additional costs of Rh2. Rhi denotes additional
costs to the company i caused by, e.g., costly treble damage suits by consumers.
Another interpretation is related to the size of the firm. If h1 and h2 denote the total
sales in other markets, in which the relevant company does not form a cartel, and
R denotes the fraction of total sales in the markets outside of cartel agreement that is
paid in fines, then real penalties paid by two equal cartel members would not be
identical.5 The second innovation of the model is that the leniency policy is not only
limited to the option of fine reduction for self-reporting firm but also takes into
account possibility of different treatment for the first and second reporter that is
5 In EC guidelines this corresponds to 10% (R = 0.1) of total annual turnover in other markets in which
relevant company does not form a cartel.
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imbedded in the current leniency rules of many competition authorities worldwide,
see, e.g., OECD report (2002) or ‘‘Appendix 5’’.
First, we describe the policy choices of the antitrust authority. Second, we specify
the firms’ strategies. And finally, we describe the timing of the game.
Enforcement policy: The main goal of the antitrust authority is to prevent cartel
formation in the first place. However, if the cartel has already been formed, the
antitrust authority aims to discover it at the lowest possible cost. Following Becker
(1968), we distinguish two main parameters of enforcement policy: penalty and
probability of detection. Hence, the antitrust policy in the presence of leniency
programs can be described by the following three parameters.
• The full fines F 2 ½0; Fmax for firms that are convicted and that have not
cooperated with the authority, where Fmax reflects the upper bound that is
exogenously given by the law. Following the Becker’s argument, in this setup,
the fixed fine F will generally be set at Fmax.
• The reduced fines f 2 ½0; FÞ specified by leniency programs. In particular, if
only one of the firms reports the cartel, then this firm pays no fine, while the
other firm will pay the normal fine, F. Moreover, we consider the setup in which
all the firms that cooperate can be granted reduced fines f. The amount of
reduction depends on the circumstances, especially the order of self-reporting
and the ’’value’’ of additional information. Applying the rules of current
European leniency practices discussed in ‘‘Appendix 3’’, the possibility of
simultaneous self-reporting by the firms should be ruled out. However, our
model is richer and can also predict in the situation where firms self-report
simultaneously. To simplify the analysis, we consider a two-firms’ game. The
first firm to self-report gets complete exemption from the fine, while the second
pays the reduced fine, f ¼ 1
2
F.6 This setup describes the most strict adherence to
the leniency rules. However, we will also consider an alternative setup, where
the antitrust authority is less strict and grants complete immunity to both firms in
case they self-report almost at the same time. This possibility will be captured by
an additional (non-traditional) instrument of antitrust authority, which we call
’’strictness’’ of leniency rules and which is denoted by a. This parameter reflects
the estimated probability that the firm, which self-report almost simultaneously
with its rival, gets zero fine.
• The probability of law enforcement by the antitrust authority equals p 2 ð0; 1:
This variable can be thought of as an instantaneous probability that the firm is
checked by antitrust authority and found guilty. Contrary to Motta and Polo
(2003), we assume that whenever the antitrust authority checks the guilty firm,
the violation is successfully discovered. Moreover, we assume that p is
determined by an exogenous budget of the antitrust authority financed by the
government that can be used to promote enforcement, so that p reflects the costs
of efforts of antitrust authority put into law enforcement activities.
6 These rules are roughly consistent with partial immunity clauses that often apply if more than one
cartelist reports. Moreover, Apesteguia et al. (2007) use a similar mechanism to design one of the
treatments in their experimental paper, which studies the effects of leniency on the stability of cartel. For
currently employed legal rules see also ‘‘Appendix 5’’.
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Firms’ strategies: We analyze two different collusive strategy profiles of the
firms ‘‘Enter Cartel and Self-report’’ and ‘‘Enter Cartel and Not Self-report’’ and one
competitive strategy profile ‘‘Not Enter the Cartel in the first place’’.
First, we consider the strategy Enter Cartel and Self-report (ES). The firms decide
to enter a cartel agreement. This may give them per period profits pm if the cartel is
stable. At the next stage of the game, one or both firms choose to report the
existence of the cartel to the authority. This allows them to obtain a reduced fine.
However, they lose not only extra profits from cartel formation but also incur
additional costs due to private law suits by consumers of Rh i, since information
about cartel becomes publicly available. The second collusive strategy is Enter
Cartel and Not Self-report (ENS). In this case, the payoff is determined as an
expectation of the monopoly gains, pm (if cartel is not convicted), and competitive
profits, pn, less the fine and losses due to the asymmetric punishment (if violation is
discovered).
The competitive strategy profile is ‘‘Not Enter the Cartel in the first place’’: (NE),
which implies that the two-stage game is reduced to one stage. In this case, both
firms obtain competitive profits pn forever. Note that 0 B pn \ pm.
Timing of the game: The two asymmetric firms play the two-stage game without
knowing the action of the rival. At time t = 0, the antitrust authority sets parameters
of enforcement policy: F and p. Here, we assume that leniency program is not yet
into existence at time t = 0, and hence, no reduction of fine is possible in case the
firm cooperates with the antitrust authority. Consequently, self-reporting is not an
option at this stage. However, firms are assumed to know that leniency programs of
known parameters will be introduced at the date t = 2. This setup resembles the
policy of most European countries and the US, where traditional antitrust
enforcement was generally introduced before the leniency program.7,8
Next, at time t = 1, ’’the cartel formation subgame’’is played. At t = 1, both
firms decide whether to participate in the cartel or stay out and realize the per period
associated payoff, respectively, pm and pn. If both firms agree to participate, the
cartel is formed and the game continues into second stage. If at least one of the firms
decides to stay out, the game stops and both firms obtain competitive profits,
pn, forever. We assume that the existence of a collusive outcome in the industry
cannot be observed by the antitrust authority until it starts an investigation in this
market.
Further, at time t = 2, the antitrust authority introduces leniency programs,
which allow firms to be exempted from the fine in case of self-reporting. Now those
7 See Table 4 in ‘‘Appendix 5’’. For example, in Netherlands LPs came into existence in 2002, 4 years
after introduction of traditional antitrust rules. At the EC level antitrust las was introduced in 1958, while
leniency programs came into existence only in 1996.
8 When leniency programs are present from t = 0, the ((E S),(E S)) equilibrium is dominated by Not
Entering ((NE),(NE)) equilibrium. In that case, the game played is not a two-stage game anymore but can
be considered as a simultaneous move game, and there are no additional cartel profits realized in the first
stage. This implies that in the situations, where the structure of the penalty scheme and leniency programs
are both introduced in the beginning of the game (t = 0), the solution of the game would follow the same
lines as described in Sect. 4 with the simplification that the strategy (E,S) will not be played in
equilibrium any more (for any possible parameter values), since it’s strictly dominated by the strategy not
to enter the cartel in the first place. The detailed proof is provided in ‘‘Appendix 4’’.
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firms, which already formed a cartel, have the choice either to keep it secret or
report it to the antitrust authority. Hence, at t = 2, ’’the revelation subgame’’ is
played, where both firms simultaneously decide whether to report the existence of
the cartel to the authority or not. If at least one of them does so, cartel formation
stops and both firms obtain pn. If no firm reveals, the antitrust authority is able to
prove them guilty and punish with probability p 2 ð0; 1 in any subsequent period.
We assume here that a firm proved guilty does not collude any more, so after being
punished firms do not go back to collusion, while in case the cartel has not been
revealed or discovered, firms sustain the collusive strategy for at least one more
period and obtain monopoly profits, pm.
9 Collusive payoff in this case is given by
the following expression Vcollusion ¼ pð pn1dFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþ dp ; where d denotes the discount
factor.10
The antitrust authority does not take an active part in the game. It only sets policy
parameters, F, f , p, a , and the rules of leniency programs. As said before, the
strictness of the leniency rules is modeled through parameter a. A ’’strict’’ antitrust
authority would give complete exemption from the fine only to the self-reporting
firm, which is literally the first to self-report. In this case, the parameter a is close to
zero, and the firm that cooperates will almost surely get only partial exemption.
Hence, it pays the reduced fine, f ¼ 1
2
F. A ’’mild’’ antitrust authority can give
complete exemption from the fine to all the firms that cooperated.11 In this case, the
parameter a is equal to 1, and every cooperating firm gets zero fine. It speaks for
itself that in our model a is only relevant when both firms self-report at the same
stage of the game.
It should also be mentioned that under a regular antitrust policy without a
leniency program, collusion can be sustained only when the short run gain from
undercutting is smaller than the expected loss triggered by the deviation. This loss
follows from the fact that cartel profits, pm, will be replaced by competitive profits,
pn. Hence, collusion under a regular antitrust policy (i.e., when leniency is not
available, and only rate of law enforcement and fine are instruments of competition
authority) takes place only when the following inequality is satisfied for each firm
9 Similar assumption was adopted in Chen and Harrington (2007). In general, there is no consensus in the
literature on that. For example, Motta and Polo (2003) employ an opposite assumption. The best approach
would be to unify the two assumptions by introducing ‘‘cartel culture’’ parameter, which reflects the
probability of renewing cartel agreement after a conviction, as explained in Houba et al. (2008). In our
setup under alternative assumption, where firms keep on colluding as long as no cartel member has
deviated even after a detection, results of the analysis seem to be qualitatively similar.
10 The complete derivation of this expression is quite easy to show using the recursive formula. Value of
the strategy (Enter and Not self-report) (collusive strategy) can be written as V ¼ ð1  pÞ½pm þ dV  þ
p½ðpn  Rhi  FÞþ pnd1d. Here, with probability (1 - p), firms can continue collusion in the next period
and with probability p cartel will be discovered in the next period, which implies competitive profits ever
after, fine, and losses due to additional punishments. Now, solving for V, we obtain that
V ¼ pð pn1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp :
11 Recall the example of leniency programs designed by Swiss competition authority in 2004 that has
been discussed in introduction.
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pð pn
1d  F  RhiÞ þ ð1  pÞpm
1  d þ dp [ 2pm  pðF þ RhiÞ þ
dpn
1  d for i ¼ 1; 2: ð1Þ
Here, 2pm reflects the extra profits from undercutting, since we assume there
are only two firms in the market. This inequality implies that collusion can arise
only when the discount factor is large enough, namely, d pmð1þpÞppnð1pÞð2pmpnðFþRhiÞpÞ for
i = 1,2. This condition states that the discount factor required to induce collusion is
smaller if either the difference between monopoly profit and competitive profit (the
gains of cartel) increases and/or the expected fine (the expected costs following
discovery of the cartel) decreases. If this condition is not met, it is more attractive
for either of the firms to deviate from the collusive strategy and obtain monopoly
profits for one period and then compete for the rest of the game. For the further
analysis, we restrict our attention to the case where this condition is met for both
firms, which implies that in the absence of leniency programs, the equilibrium state
is collusion. Hence, inequality (1) represents a necessary condition for the second
stage of the game (’’revelation subgame’’ played at t = 2) to be reached. Another
important restriction on the discount factor is d pm
2pmpn, which implies that in the
absence of the antitrust policy, collusion would arise in equilibrium.12 Note that in
this case, the second stage of the game (’’revelation subgame’’) is also automatically
reached, since it is implied by d pmð1þpÞppnð1pÞð2pmpnðFþRhiÞpÞ.
It should be stressed that for any t [ 2 , the decisions of both players do not
change and payoffs obtained at t = 2 will be discounted. This is due to the fact that
the penalty is fixed, and hence, the environment does not change.13 Below, we
summarize the timing of the game.
Stage 0: Antitrust authority announces parameters of the penalty scheme, p and F.
Stage 1: Firms decide whether to be in a cartel or not (once and for all decision).
Stage 2a: Antitrust authority introduces leniency program.
Stage 2b: Firms decide whether to self-report or not (once and for all decision). If
no self-reporting by both firms is chosen, then repeated game between authority
and firms, where authority can discover violation with probability p in each
period, is played till infinity.
The discount factor is given by d ¼ 1
1þr, where r is the interest rate. The game
tree and players’ payoffs are described in Fig. 1.
We now proceed to establish the subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game,
which is described in Fig. 1, played among firms once the policy parameters are set.
12 In the absence of any antitrust enforcement, i.e., when neither fines nor rate of law enforcement can be
used, collusion can be sustained only when the short run gain from an unilateral deviation from collusive
agreement by undercutting in prices together with competitive profits thereafter is smaller than the payoff
from sustaining collusive strategy forever: pm
1d [ 2pm þ dpn1d for i ¼ 1; 2.
13 The setup with fixed penalties is widely analyzed in the literature (see Motta and Polo 2003; Spagnolo
2004). For the extension of the analysis of antitrust violations, when fines are proportional to illegal gains
from price-fixing (or degree of violation), see Motchenkova (2008), or Motchenkova and Kort (2006). In
the setup with proportional penalties, the process is not stationary, environment changes over time, and
then, it is necessary to introduce an additional state variable for accumulated illegal gains.
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3 Solution of the game
3.1 Solution of ‘‘revelation subgame’’
To find the subgame perfect equilibria of the game, consider first the ’’revelation
subgame’’, which is played in stage 2. In case of almost simultaneous self-reporting,
a firm i gets a payoff of pn
1d  Rhi  ð1aÞ2 F: This expression reflects the current EU
rules that the first firm to self-report gets complete exemption from the fine, while
the second pays the reduced fine, f ¼ 1
2
F, see EC (2006a). Given that the other firm
self-reports at approximately the same time, the probability to be the first to report
and get zero fine is a. However, there is also a chance (1 - a) that another firm is
the leader in the ’’race to the court’’. If a firm i does not self-report but the other firm
does, then this firm receives a payoff of pn
1d  Rhi  F; while the other firm is
granted complete leniency and obtains pn
1d  Rhj: Note that there is still a negative
asymmetric punishment effect, due to, for example, private law suits by consumers
after information about the cartel becomes public. Finally, if no firm self-reports,
each firm receives an expected payoff
pð pn
1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1 dþ dp :
14 The normal form of the
simultaneous move ’’revelation subgame’’ is given in Table 1.
The normal form matrix game described in Table 1 can have either one or two
pure strategy Nash equilibria depending on parameter values. The strategy (S, S), in
which all firms choose to self-report, is always a Nash equilibrium for any values of
Firm 1 
Enter Not Enter
Firm2  
E NE E NE
Firm 1  
πm πn/(1-δ)                   πn/(1-δ)                 πn/(1-δ) 
πm πn/(1-δ)                   πn/(1-δ)                 πn/(1-δ) 
Firm 2 
Self-report Not Self-repot
S N S S NS
πn/(1-δ)-Rh1-(1-α)*1/2*F   πn/(1-δ)-Rh1        πn/(1-δ)-Rh1-F  (p(πn/(1-δ)-Rh1-F)+(1-p)πm)/(1-δ+δp)
πn/(1-δ)-Rh2-(1-α)*1/2*F   πn/(1-δ)-Rh2-F   πn/(1-δ)-Rh2    (p(πn/(1-δ)-Rh2-F)+(1-p)πm)/(1-δ+δp)
Fig. 1 Game tree and players’ payoffs
14 The complete derivation of this expression was provided in footnote 10 of Sect. 2.
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parameters of the model. The tuple (Not Self-report, Not Self-report), or (N, N), is
the second pure strategy Nash equilibrium if the following condition holds
pð pn
1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp  pn1d  Rhi; i ¼ 1; 2: Moreover, when the above inequality
holds, the (N, N) equilibrium also Pareto dominates the (S, S) equilibrium, since
then
pð pn
1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp  pn1d  Rhi  ð1aÞ2 F is also satisfied. The last inequality
implies that for the class of parameter values with sufficiently low rate of law
enforcement, i.e., p pmpn þRhið1dÞþ
ð1dÞð1aÞ
2
F
pmpn þRhið1dÞþ ð1dð1aÞ2 ÞF
, the normal form matrix game in
Table 1 might have two pure strategy Nash equilibria, where (N, N) equilibrium is
Pareto-dominant and, hence, will be chosen.15 For another class of parameter
values, namely when the above inequality is reversed (i.e., condition in (2) is
satisfied), (S, S) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the normal form game in Table 1.
This implies that self-reporting can be sustained in equilibrium if the following
condition holds:
p [
pm  pn þ Rhið1  dÞ þ ð1dÞð1aÞ2 F
pm  pn þ Rhið1  dÞ þ ð1  dð1aÞ2 ÞF
¼ pðF; hi; aÞ for i ¼ 1; 2 ð2Þ
It is easily verified that for player i the payoff from self-reporting is strictly
greater than the payoff from keeping the cartel secret, only when p [ pðF; hi; aÞ.16
Only if pn
1d  Rh1  ð1aÞ2 F [
pð pn
1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp for i = 1, 2, then (S, S) is the
equilibrium outcome of the ‘‘revelation subgame’’, and hence, (Enter and Self-
report) outcome will be preferred by both firms over (Enter and Not Self-report)
outcome in the two-stage game. Therefore, following Pareto-dominance criterion,
firms self-report in the second stage only if p [ pðF; hi; aÞ: This gives us the first
incentive compatibility constraint. We represent it in Fig. 2 by the line p; which
plots a (p) as a convex decreasing function of p in the (p, a) - space.
Table 1 The normal form of the simultaneous move ‘‘revelation subgame’’
firm 1 firm 2
Self-report (S) Not self-report (NS)
Self-report (S) pn
1d  Rh1  ð1aÞ2 F; pn1d  Rh2  ð1aÞ2 F
pn
1d  Rh1; pn1d  Rh2  F
Not self-report (NS) pn
1d  Rh1  F; pn1d  Rh2 pð
pn
1dRh1FÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp ;
pð pn
1dRh2FÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp
15 The notion of Pareto-dominant equilibrium is well established in the literature (see, for example,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) pp. 20-22). Following their arguments, players will coordinate on the
Pareto-dominant equilibrium if they are able to talk to one another before the game is played and agree to
play highest payoff equilibrium in case of multiple Nash Equilibria. And since firms are perfectly rational
payoff maximizing agents, there is no reason for them to deviate from this agreement later on.
16 We assume here that (S, S), (S, N), or (N, S), which lead to self-reporting outcome in the second stage
of the game, can only be chosen when both inequalities
pð pn
1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp \
pn
1d  Rhi and
pð pn
1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp \
pn
1d  Rh1  ð1aÞ2 F are satisfied. This implies that p must be greater than
pðF; hi; aÞ. This assumption is equivalent to employing pareto-dominance criterion or, in other words,
choosing an outcome on the pareto frontier.
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In addition, comparative statics of the behavior of pðF; hi; aÞ with respect to the
main parameters of the model shows that
opðF; hi; aÞ
ohi
[ 0;
opðF; hi; aÞ
oF
\0;
opðF; hi; aÞ
oa
\0: ð3Þ
The first inequality is a result of incorporating the level of asymmetries in
punishments. The bigger the asymmetric punishment effect (or the higher the
turnover from markets not cartelized compared to total turnover) the bigger the
incentives for the firm to abstain from self-reporting. Since a bigger threshold
probability pðF; hi; aÞ implies that greater efforts from antitrust authority, in terms
of increasing the rate of law enforcement, are needed in order to induce the self-
reporting by this firm. The second inequality in (3) reflects the usual trade-off
between the probability and severity of punishment extensively discussed in Becker
(1968) and in Garoupa (1997, 2001). The third inequality in (3) implies that the
uncertainty of the firms about getting the first prize (or, in other words, strictness of
the rules for leniency,17 which can grant the complete exemption from the fine only
to one firm (the US system)) actually reduces the incentives for both types of the
firms to self-report.
3.2 Solution of ‘‘cartel formation subgame’’
Now we move on to the decision taken by the firms in stage 1 of the game. For each
firm, we have to calculate the discounted sum of profits if firms form a cartel and
compare it with the discounted sum of profits in case the cartel is not formed. This
comparison has to be done for both cases: when firms decide to self-report in the
second stage of the game and when they prefer to continue the cartel.
First, we consider the betrayal scenario where one or both firms choose the
strategy Enter Cartel and Self-report, which we denote (E S). According to the
α* 
p* 
 0 p** 
α
α*>1 p*
p** 1
Less diversified firm  ( h2 is low) More diversified firm  ( h1 is high) 
α
p    p 0 1
NE
NE
E NSE NS
E S
Fig. 2 Incentive compatibility constraints for two types of firms
17 We refer here to the current US Leniency rules. See Table 3 in ‘‘Appendix 3’’. These rules correspond
to low a in our setting, which means that there is very high uncertainty for the firms about getting the first
prize. From the third inequality in (3) it follows that in this case the threshold probability pðF; hi; aÞ is
maximal and hence, the incentives for the firms to self-report are reduced.
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analysis of the previous section, this strategy can arise when p [ pðF; hi; aÞ for
i = 1 or i = 2, or both. In case both firms self-report in the second stage of the
game, the expected payoff for each firm includes the collusive profits obtained at
t = 1 plus the expected payoff from simultaneous self-reporting at t = 2, derived in
the previous sub-section, and is given by the following expression18:
VES ¼ pmd þ
pn
1  d  Rhi 
ð1  aÞ
2
F: ð4Þ
However, when no agreement about cartel formation is reached, the discounted
payoffs for both firms, evaluated at t = 2, are given by VNE ¼ pndð1dÞ :
Collusion and self-reporting will arise if VES [ VNE, that is, if the following
condition is satisfied:
pm  pn
d
 Rhi  ð1  aÞ
2
F [ 0: ð5Þ
This implies that the value of the parameter a that is necessary in order to ensure
that the cartel is not formed should satisfy:
a\aðhi; FÞ ¼ 2Rhid þ Fd  2ðpm  pnÞdF ; i ¼ 1 or 2: ð6Þ
This expression provides the second incentive compatibility constraint, which is
represented in Fig. 2 by the horizontal line a: Note that three considerably different
solutions can arise depending on the parameter values of the model. When 2Rhid ?
Fd[ 2(pm - pn) [ 2Rhid, we obtain from (6) that 0\aðhi; FÞ\1, and then, the
graph in the right part of Fig. 2 applies. When 2(pm - pn) \ 2Rhid, we obtain from
(6) that aðhi; FÞ[ 1, and then, the incentive compatibility constraints and SPNEs
of the game are represented by the graph in the left part of Fig. 2. The third
possibility is when 2Rhid ? Fd B 2(pm - pn), so that aðhi; FÞ 0: In this case, the
equilibrium with no collusion will be lost. The competitive outcome will not arise in
equilibrium for any parameter values. The intuition behind this result refers to the
fact that when the losses to the firm both due to the fine imposed and due to the
additional asymmetric punishments are not high enough, the leniency programs can,
actually, have an adverse effect. Too low fines can lead to an outcome were all the
firms will participate in a cartel agreement and then depending on the size of relative
gains and losses reveal it or keep it secret.
The expression (5) implies that the higher the asymmetric punishment effect, Rhi,
the less likely this inequality will hold. Hence, a bigger firm, which operates in
many markets, would be less willing to enter the cartel agreement in the first place.
In other words, for bigger firms, the strategy to form a cartel, and then self-report is
more likely to be dominated by a strategy of not entering the cartel agreement in the
first stage compared to a smaller firm.
18 To simplify the calculations, we evaluate all the payoffs at time t = 2. So, we discount payoffs
obtained at t = 1 into second period with the factor ð1 þ rÞ ¼ 1d ; and payoffs obtained in periods t [ 2
into second period with discount factor 1ð1þrÞt2 ¼ d
t2:
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We may also notice that the decision of both firms when they choose between the
strategy Enter Cartel and Self-report or Not Enter the cartel at all does not depend
on the value of p (rate of law enforcement). However, it does depend on other
parameters of the model, such as F and a. In particular, a higher fine reduces the
value of the strategy Enter Cartel and Self-report and increases the incentives for the
firms to stay out of the cartel. At the same time, the lower the parameter a , which
reflects the perceived probability for the firm to be the first to report, or the higher
the uncertainty about getting the first prize, the greater the incentives for the firms to
stay out of the cartel.
Looking at the first and second incentive compatibility constraint simulta-
neously,19 we obtain that for a\aðhi; FÞ; i ¼ 1; 2 firms choose not to enter the
cartel in the first place, and for all a [ aðhi; FÞ; i ¼ 1; 2 and p [ pðF; hi; aÞ; i ¼
1; 2 firms prefer to collude and then self-report in the second stage of the game. This
proves the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For given policy parameters (F, f, p, a), a subgame perfect equilibrium
in which firms enter the cartel and self-report exists if p [ pðF; hi; aÞ and
a[ aðhi; FÞ for i = 1, 2.
The outcome of this lemma is depicted in the right part of Fig. 2 by the shaded
trapezium. In the left part of Fig. 2, this equilibrium is absent, since for more
diversified firms the value of a is likely to be close to 1. The right part of Fig. 2
shows that for p [ p and a[ a both firms decide to enter the cartel in the first
stage and then, because of the high probability of conviction and the fact that rules
of leniency programs are not strict, so that almost surely every cooperating firm gets
complete immunity from fine, firms choose to reveal the violation.
Next, we look at the second possible outcome of the stage 2 of the game, where
both firms choose not to self-report. This outcome arises under condition
p pðF; hi; aÞ for both i = 1, 2. In this case, firms anticipate that neither of them
will reveal any information. The expected payoff from playing this strategy for each
firm includes the collusive profits obtained at t = 1 plus the expected payoff from
non-cooperation with antitrust authority at t = 2 and is given by the following
expression20:
VENS ¼ pmd þ
pð pn
1d  Rhi  FÞ þ ð1  pÞpm
1  d þ dp :
Again, when no agreement about cartel formation is reached, the discounted
payoffs for both firms evaluated at t = 2 are given by VNE ¼ pndð1dÞ :
Collusion will arise if VE NS [ VNE, that is if the following condition is satisfied:
p pm  pn
dðF þ RhiÞ ¼ p
ðF; hiÞ for i ¼ 1; 2: ð7Þ
Comparative statics of (7) with respect to the main parameters shows that
19 See the right part of Fig. 2, which reflects the case where the critical value of a is less than one.
20 Recall Sects. 2 and 3.1.
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opðF; hiÞ
ohi
\0;
opðF; hiÞ
oF
\0: ð8Þ
The first inequality implies that the bigger the size of the firm (or the higher the
asymmetric punishment effect), the smaller the threshold probability pðF; hiÞ; and
hence, the easier for antitrust authority to prevent the firm from entering the cartel
agreement in the first stage of the game. The second inequality, as above, reflects the
usual trade-off between the probability of detection and the severity of punishment.
Expression (7) provides the third incentive compatibility constraint, which
implies that the strategy ‘‘Enter cartel and Not Self-report’’ is preferred to not
entering by both firms when p pðF; hiÞ; i ¼ 1; 2, see also Fig. 2. Further, recall
the first incentive compatibility constraint, which implies that not self-reporting is
preferred to self-reporting in the second stage if p pðF; hi; aÞ; i ¼ 1; 2:
Combining these two constraints, we obtain lemma 2.
Lemma 2 For given policy parameters (F, f, p, a), a subgame perfect equilibrium
in which firms enter the cartel and do not self-report exists if p pðF; hi; aÞ and
p pðF; hiÞ; i ¼ 1; 2:
The result of this lemma is quite intuitive. For low values of the rate of law
enforcement, the worst outcome for society may arise, i.e., firms collude and keep
the cartel secret, even when leniency is introduced.
Figure 2 illustrates the incentive compatibility constraints (pðF; hi; aÞ;
pðF; hiÞ, and aðF; hiÞ) for two types of firms. The left part of the figure shows
that for more diversified firms (firms with higher sales outside the cartel or firms
with bigger asymmetric punishment effect), even in the presence of leniency
programs, only two possible outcomes (no collusion and cartel without reporting)
can arise. So, for these firms, leniency programs are ineffective. The right part of
Fig. 2 illustrates the situation with less diversified firms (firms with lower sales
outside the cartel or firms with smaller asymmetric punishment effect). In this case,
leniency programs can be effective for some parameter values. Self-reporting
outcome, (E, S), arises when parameters p and a are sufficiently high (shaded area in
the right part of Fig. 2). Moreover, looking at the right part of Fig. 2, we conclude
that for high values of a , when leniency programs are less strict, the effectiveness
of antitrust enforcement can be improved more easily, since then a lower rate of law
enforcement is necessary in order to obtain the second best outcome (Enter and Self-
report).
Finally, based on Lemmas 1 and 2, we can conclude that the following
proposition holds.
Proposition 3 Once the policy parameters (F, f, p, a) are set, in the repeated
game played by the firms from t = 1 on, we can describe the Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium (SPE) in the (p, a)-space as follows:
1. When aðhi; FÞ 1 for i = 1, 2, i.e., when (pm - pn) \ Rhid for both firms, the
Pareto-dominant SPE is ((E NS),(E NS)) for p\mini¼ 1;2pðF; hiÞÞ; while the
unique SPE is (NE, NE) otherwise.
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2. When 0 aðhi; FÞ\1 for i = 1, 2, i.e., when Rhid þ 12 Fd [ ðpm  pnÞ[ Rhid
for both firms, the Pareto-dominant SPE is ((E NS),(E NS)) for
p\mini¼ 1;2pðF; hiÞÞ and p\mini¼ 1;2pðF; hi; aÞ; it is ((E S),(E S)) for
p [ maxi¼ 1;2pðF; hi; aÞ and a[ maxi¼ 1;2aðF; hiÞ; while the unique SPE is
(NE, NE) otherwise.
3. When aðhi; FÞ\0 for i = 1, 2, i.e., when ðpm  pnÞ[ Rhid þ 12 Fd for both
firms, the Pareto-dominant SPE is ((E NS),(E NS)) for p\mini¼ 1;2pðF; hi; aÞ;
while the outcome with self-reporting arises otherwise.
Proof See ‘‘Appendix 1’’. h
This proposition identifies the regions where the (Enter and Self-report), (Enter
and Not Self-report), and (Not Enter) equilibria exist. Clearly, both parameters p
and a influence the choice of the non-collusive strategy. Moreover, all three possible
outcomes can arise in equilibrium only for intermediate range of profits, i.e., when
Rhid þ 12 Fd[ ðpm  pnÞ[ Rhid for i = 1,2. For low gains from collusion, when
(pm - pn) \ Rhid, i = 1, 2, a SPE where both firms choose to enter and self-report
does not exist. While, when gains from collusion are high, ðpm  pnÞ[ Rhid þ
1
2
Fd; i ¼ 1; 2; a pure competitive SPE does not exist.
4 Optimal enforcement (implementing the competitive outcome)
This section provides an analysis of the enforcement strategies of an antitrust
authority, which has the aim to prevent cartel formation in the industry. Here, we
study the optimal enforcement policy in the game described in Sect. 3 The objective
of benevolent antitrust authority is to maximize the discounted consumer surplus
less the costs of control. Later, we will also consider the situation when the authority
maximizes not only the discounted consumer surplus but also the amount of
collected fines. It is generally assumed (see e.g., Motta and Polo 2003) that the costs
of control and amount of fines are completely determined by parameter p. Hence,
the enforcement strategies are determined mainly through the rate of law
enforcement, p. Further, we assume that the fine is fixed and equals its legal upper
bound. However, in our setting, there are two additional instruments that the
antitrust authority can use to achieve the no-collusion outcome. One of them is
leniency, i.e., the possibility of fine reduction if firms self-report; and the second is
the strictness of leniency programs, or the possibility of getting complete exemption
from the fine even in case simultaneous self-report occurs. These two instruments
influence the amount of collected fines.
First, we consider the objective function of the benevolent regulator, who does
not aim at maximization of collected fines. In this case, the objective function of the
authority is as follows: Wðp; aÞ ¼ maxp;af CS1d  CðpÞg ¼ CS1d þ minpfCðpÞg. This
setup is widely used in the literature. See, for example Motta and Polo (2003). In
addition, we also provide analysis of different setup, since it reflects better the real
practice in some European competition authorities. In the Netherlands, for example,
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objective function of most law enforcement agencies includes maximization of
collected fines. In the second setup, as the amount of collected fines also depend on
the strictness of leniency programs, the antitrust authority maximizes the following
objective function: Wðp; aÞ ¼ maxp;af CS1d  CðpÞ þ p
P
fiðaÞg. In both setups, the
aim of the authority is to maximize discounted stream of consumer benefits CS
1d.
21
The authority also wants to minimize the costs of control that are reflected in the
term C(p), which serves as a generalized notation for accumulated costs of audit,
where discounting is already taken into account. C(p) is assumed to be increasing
and concave. In the second setup, we assume that the additional regulator’s aim is to
maximize the amount of fines. This is reflected in the term p
P
fi(a), which serves as
a generalized notation for expected accumulated collected fines. f(a) is assumed to
be decreasing and concave function of a.
The specific characteristic of our model is that we consider heterogeneous firms,
in the sense that they may be subject to different local legislation or their total
turnover may differ from the turnover of the market corrupted by the cartel
agreement, which implies asymmetric punishments. We point out the following
regularities for the threshold probabilities that have been derived above. Assume
h1 [ h2, then for the threshold probability determined in the ’’revelation subgame’’
the following inequality holds: pðF; h2; aÞ\pðF; h1; aÞ: However, for the
threshold probability determined in the ’’cartel formation subgame’’, the opposite
holds: pðF; h1Þ\pðF; h2Þ. Hence, it is more difficult to enforce self-reporting by
bigger firms (that have higher turnover), but at the same time a smaller rate of law
enforcement (less policing) is necessary in order to prevent the bigger firm from
entering the cartel in the first place.
First, we specify the enforcement technology and calculate welfare gains from
implementing outcomes that are best for society. These outcomes maximize the
consumer surplus less the costs of control in the first setup. While, in the second
setup, they maximize the sum of consumer surplus and collected fines minus costs
of control. We assume that imposing the monetary fines and determining the
strictness of leniency programs is not costly, while increasing the probability of
discovery involves costs. In general, we expect a trade-off not only between the rate
of law enforcement (policing) and the amount of imposed fines (fining), but also
between the rate of law enforcement (policing) and the rules of leniency programs:
increasing the strictness of leniency rules would imply a reduction in the level of
policing required to reach a desired level of cartel formation and discovery.
However, we will see that this intuitive trade-off does not always work in this
direction.
In the further analysis, dead weight losses will approximate losses of consumer
surplus due to the fact that the market outcome does not coincide with competitive
one. The traditional dead weight loss (DWL) measures the welfare gains associated
with a successful intervention that induces a more competitive market equilibrium.
We evaluate the welfare gains of antitrust enforcement by comparing the
21 Note that the Consumer Surplus (CS) from cartel deterrence by the Antitrust authority is constant and
does not depend on parameters of the model and the policy instruments. It just reflects an increase in
consumer welfare due to price reduction from cartel price level to competitive level.
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equilibrium outcomes where both firms ‘‘do Not Enter’’, ‘‘Enter and Self-report’’,
and ‘‘Enter and Not Self-report’’ to the situation with collusion. Note that the
antitrust authority will rank the regions as follows: (NE) gives higher welfare gains
than (E S), and (E S) gives higher welfare gains than (E NS). Cartels entail an
allocative efficiency loss, and therefore, the antitrust authority aims to deter or break
them if they are already formed. In the first case, (NE), cartels are deterred; in the
second case, (E S), cartels are broken in the second stage if they happen to be
formed in the first stage; in the third case, (E NS), only those cartels, which are
investigated, will be broken.
4.1 Optimal enforcement in the two-stage game
In this subsection, we identify the optimal policies of the antitrust authority. Recall
that the antitrust authority changes its policy throughout the planning horizon in the
sense that leniency is introduced later in time than the penalty scheme. We first
characterize the optimal policy when the antitrust authority wants to implement
each of the three outcomes (NE), (E S), or (E NS). Then, we compare the
implementable outcomes and select the best one.
As a general point in all the equilibrium outcomes, it is always optimal to set the
fine equal to its legal upper bound since increasing the fines is not costly and allows
to obtain more favorable (lower) boundaries for the threshold probabilities for the
rate of law enforcement.
In the model described above, savings of dead weight loss SDWL
1d are the welfare
gains from the ‘‘Not Enter’’ equilibrium. The welfare gains in case of the ‘‘Enter and
Self-report’’ equilibrium are SDWL
1d  SDWL ¼ dSDWLð1dÞ .22 In the ‘‘Enter and Not Self-
report’’ equilibrium, the antitrust authority interrupts collusion only with probability
p; hence, the welfare gains are pdSDWLð1dÞ : Note that the following inequality holds:
SDWL
1d [
dSDWL
ð1dÞ [
pdSDWL
ð1dÞ : Hence, the most favorable for society outcome is no cartel
formation, second best is when firms collude and then reveal the cartel after
leniency programs are introduced. The worst for society outcome is ‘‘Collude and
Not Reveal’’. Of course, this information is not enough for determination of the
equilibrium that maximizes welfare, costs of enforcement and collected fines should
be taken into account.
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal policies to implement each of the three outcomes
discussed above, if h1 [ h2, i.e., firm 1 is ‘‘bigger’’ or has higher turnover. The solid
lines p1; p

1 , and a

1 represent the incentive compatibility constraints for the
‘‘bigger’’ firm (that is subject to the higher asymmetric punishment effect), while the
dashed lines p2; p

2 , and a

2 represent the incentive compatibility constraints for
the ‘‘small’’ firm (that suffers less from asymmetric punishment effect). In the right
part of Fig. 3, we illustrate the situation where threshold on parameter a (specified
in (6)) is smaller than 1 for both firms. Recall that a in (6) specifies the upper bound
on parameter a such that entering cartel and self-reporting would be less attractive
22 Here, we subtract the DWL in the first stage of the game, when the cartel is formed, from the total
savings of DWL from period t = 1 on, given by SDWL
1d .
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than staying out of cartel. It is also possible that threshold a in (6) is greater than 1
for the ‘‘bigger’’ firm. In this case, the left part of Fig. 3 applies and the range of
parameter values, for which (E, S) outcome arises, will be reduced considerably. To
interpret the figure, we should also note that the (NE) outcome will arise when it is
profitable for at least one of the firms not to enter the cartel agreement. The
(E, S) outcome will arise when it is attractive to self-report for at least one of the
firms. However, the (E, NS) outcome can only arise when entering the cartel
agreement and keeping it secret is attractive for both firms. After analyzing
incentive compatibility constraints for both types of the firms simultaneously and
taking into account the above considerations, we can state the optimal policies that
implement the ‘‘Not Enter’’, ‘‘Enter and Self-report’’, and ‘‘Enter and Not Self-
report’’ outcomes. These results are summarized in propositions 4 and 5.
In the next proposition, we state results for the setup, where the objective function
of the antitrust authority is given by Wðp; aÞ ¼ maxp;afSDWL1d  CðpðaÞÞg ¼ SDWL1d þ
minp;afCðpðaÞÞg: In this case, the benevolent antitrust authority takes into account
only the objective of minimizing dead weight loss and reducing the costs of law
enforcement. In this setup, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 4 Let h1 [ h2 and the objective function of the antitrust authority is
given by Wðp; aÞ ¼ maxp;afSDWL1d  CðpðaÞÞg.
In the repeated game played by the firms, the optimal policies of antitrust
authority that implement the (NE), (E S), and (E NS) outcomes are:
• The optimal policy to implement (NE) sets p ¼ p1 and a 2 ½0; aðF; h1ÞÞ:
• The optimal policy to implement (E S) sets p ¼ p2ð1Þ and a = 1.
• The optimal policy to implement (E NS) sets p ¼ 0; a 2 ½0; 1 if dSDWLð1dÞ  11d \0,
or p ¼ p1 ; a 2 ½0; a if dSDWLð1dÞ  11d  0:
Proof See ‘‘Appendix 2’’. h
   p
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Fig. 3 The optimal policies that implement the (NE), (E S), and (E NS) outcomes. Solid lines represent
incentive compatibility constraints for the ‘‘bigger’’ firm, and dashed lines represent incentive
compatibility constraints for the ‘‘smaller’’ firm
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Based on the results of proposition 4, we can conclude that the first best outcome,
i.e., when the cartel is not formed, can be achieved only with a sufficiently high rate
of law enforcement, i.e., p p1 ; and when the rules of leniency programs are strict
enough, a\aðF; h1Þ. In other words, in case of simultaneous self-reporting, both
firms almost certainly get only partial exemption from the fine. However, if the
cartel has already been formed in the first stage, before the leniency program was
introduced, the optimal policy that can ensure the second best outcome, i.e., self-
reporting in the second stage, should impose a lower rate of law enforcement, p2ð1Þ;
and less strict rules of leniency programs, a = 1. Hence, in general, the enforcement
that aims at stopping formation of already existing cartels should be less strict.
The next proposition analyzes the case when the antitrust authority maximizes
not only the discounted consumer surplus but also the amount of collected fines. As
discussed above, this setup reflects better the current practice at some competition
authorities.
Proposition 5 Let h1 [ h2. Given the objective function of antitrust authority:
Wðp; aÞ ¼ maxp;afSDWL1d  CðpÞ þ p
P
fiðaÞg; in the repeated game played by the
firms from t = 1 on, the optimal policies are:
• Implementing (NE) outcome sets p ¼ p1 and a 2 ½0; aðF; h1Þ:
• Implementing (E S) outcome picks up the point that satisfies the equation
ðp2ðaÞÞ0a ¼ F, if at this solution p\p1 . Otherwise, if p [ p1 ; then the
optimal policy to implement (E S) sets p ¼ p2ð1Þ and a = 1 or p ¼ p1 and
a ¼ a:
• Implementing ((E NS), (E NS)) sets p = 0 and a 2 ½0; 1 if dSDWLð1dÞ  11d þ 2F\0;
or p ¼ p1 and a 2 ½0; a if dSDWLð1dÞ  11d þ 2F  0:
Proof See ‘‘Appendix 3’’. h
Combining results of propositions 4 and 5, we conclude that under different
objective functions results are qualitatively similar. An interesting implication of
this analysis is that the regulation by a benevolent authority would not only lead to
lower fines for firms and less strict leniency programs but also reduce the costs of
law enforcement in some scenarios.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the effects of antitrust enforcement and leniency programs on the
behavior of firms participating in cartel agreements. The main innovation is that we
consider heterogeneous firms. In general, firms have different size and operate in
several different markets. However, they may form a cartel only in one or several
markets. This gives rise to additional costs in case of disclosure of cartel caused by
an asymmetric punishment effect: when penalty is proportional to overall turnover
of the company, firms of different size participating in the same cartel agreement
will pay different fines. The same modeling framework can be applied to the case of
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international cartels, where firms that form a cartel are subject to different
punishment procedures.23
The important example of this asymmetry concerns international cartels of
European and US firms. The graphite electrode cartel, UCAR International, which
was discovered in 1998, is a good illustration of this point.24 In this situation, due to
the different legal procedures and the fact that in the US consumers engage in
private law suits more often than in Europe, the actual penalty for the US firm would
be different from the one for the European firm in case a cartel is discovered and
information about its existence becomes public. For example, in the UCAR’s case,
due to the different systems of fine imposition in the US and Europe, the maximal
punishments for similar members of the UCAR International cartel differ almost
twice (with the fine of about 100 millon Euro in Europe and the fine of about 200-
400 million US Dollars for the US leg of the cartel).25 This provides strong evidence
of ‘‘asymmetric punishment effect’’ in real antitrust practice. Hence, following the
terminology introduced in this paper, the US part of the UCAR cartel is subject to
higher asymmetric punishment effect, i.e., it suffers higher costs in case of
disclosure of cartel. Further, according to the official journal, only the EU leg of the
cartel was given a fine reduction due to application for leniency, the US leg did not
cooperate with the Department of Justice.
First, we describe the general results, and then, we relate them to the UCAR’s
case for illustration. We found that the bigger the size of the firm (or the higher the
asymmetric punishment effect), the higher the incentives for this firm to keep the
cartel secret. Then, greater efforts from the antitrust authority, in terms of increasing
the rate of law enforcement, are needed in order to induce self-reporting by this
firm. So, leniency programs work better for companies with lower asymmetric
punishment effect in the sense that they result in self-reporting by these firms while
the rate of law enforcement is lower, which implies lower costs for society. This
conclusion seems to be confirmed in the UCAR’s case as the EU leg of the cartel
decided to apply for leniency, while the US leg of this international cartel chose not
to cooperate (possibly due to the threat of higher maximal punishment in case of
disclosure).
Further, we conclude that for bigger firms the strategy of not entering the cartel
agreement in the first stage of the game is more likely to be preferred over the
strategy to form a cartel and then self-report than for smaller firms. The bigger the
size of the firm (or the higher additional losses other than fines), the easier it is for
the antitrust authority to prevent the firm from entering the cartel agreement in the
23 This framework can also be used for an analysis of the effectiveness of leniency programs in situations
where disclosure of cartel can lead to any additional costs for the firms different from the fine for
violations of competition law itself. Those costs can result from the threat that tax authorities will conduct
additional control and possibly frauds connected with cartel agreements will be discovered, or consumers
will challenge firms in the courts applying for compensation of private damages.
24 The discussion of the graphite electrode cartel, UCAR International, is adopted from Wehmhorner
(2005). More detailed description of fining decisions can also be found in ‘‘Appendix 5’’.
25 For details of how fines are determined, see Tables 6 and 7 in ‘‘Appendix 5’’. It should also be stressed
that these are not actual (imposed) fines, but maximal fines that should have been set according to the
Sentencing Guidelines in the EU and US in 2001 (before application for leniency by the EU leg and
inability to pay by the US leg were taken into account).
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first stage of the game. Hence, big firms (or firms for which costs in case of
disclosure are higher) are more reluctant to start a cartel in the first place.
Another innovation of this paper is that the enforcement strategies of antitrust
authority are determined not only through the rate of law enforcement but also
through an additional instrument (called ’’strictness’’ of leniency programs), i.e.,
introducing the possibility of getting complete exemption from the fine even in case
many firms self-report simultaneously. We study the impact of the ’’strictness’’ of
leniency programs on the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement and derive the
optimal enforcement strategies. They represent the optimal combination of
instruments of the authority: rate of law enforcement and ’’strictness’’ of leniency
programs. Uncertainty of the firms about getting the first prize (or, in other words,
strictness of the rules for leniency, which can grant the complete exemption from
the fine only to one firm) reduces the incentives for both types of firms to report.
This conclusion also seems to be relevant for the case of UCAR’s cartel discussed
above. The interpretation is as follows. The US leniency program grants complete
exemption only to the first reporter, while the EU leniency rules allow substantial
fine reductions for several reporting firms. Hence, EU leniency programs can be
viewed as less strict in the terminology offered in this paper. In the US, given
stricter leniency programs, there is more uncertainty of the firms about ‘‘getting the
first prize’’. According to the analysis performed in this model, this would imply
less incentives to self-report. This impact on self-reporting incentives also seems to
be confirmed in the UCAR’s case, where only the EU member of the cartel decided
to apply for leniency.
Another implication of our analysis is that in a highly cartelized economy, where
a lot of cartels are already formed, the best strategy for the antitrust authority is to
concentrate on policies that increase the incentives to self-report, in particular,
increase the fine or reduce the strictness of leniency programs. In other words, the
more cartelized the economy, the less strict the rules of leniency programs should
be, i.e., complete exemption from fines should be granted to all reporters.26 On the
other hand, when there are few cartels and leniency is not yet introduced, the
antitrust authority should implement the policy that reduces the incentives to enter
the cartel in the first place. In this case both, the fine and the strictness of the
leniency programs should be increased. Hence, when the economy is not highly
cartelized the rules of leniency programs should be stricter, i.e., complete exemption
should be granted only to the first reporter.
Finally, we conclude that the optimal enforcement can implement the compet-
itive outcome only when the rate of law enforcement is sufficiently high, and the
rules of leniency programs are sufficiently strict. Moreover, the second best
outcome, i.e., ‘‘Enter cartel and Self-report’’, can be implemented when the rate of
law enforcement is sufficiently high and the leniency programs grant complete
exemption from fines to all the firms that cooperate with antitrust authority.
26 This conclusion confirms that initial lenient design if Swiss Leniency Programs in 2004, which has
been discussed in introduction, could be a clever solution.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof The result of this proposition follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2 and the
fact that all three locuses pðF; hi; aÞ; pðF; hiÞ; and aðF; hiÞ intersect in the same
point. Simple algebraic calculations confirm that pðF; hi; aÞ ¼ pðF; hiÞ:
In order to prove this fact, we substitute aðhi; FÞ ¼ 2RhidþFd2ðpmpnÞdF into the
expression for p in (2) and show that pðF; hi; aÞ ¼ pðF; hiÞ:
Recall that pðF; hi; aÞ ¼ pmpnþRhið1dÞþ
ð1dÞð1aÞ
2
F
pmpnþRhið1dÞþð1dð1aÞ2 ÞF
:
Hence,
pðF; hi; aÞ ¼ pmpnþRhið1dÞþ
ð1dÞð12RhidþFd2ðpmpnÞ
dF
Þ
2
F
pmpnþRhið1dÞþð1
dð12RhidþFd2ðpmpnÞ
dF
Þ
2
ÞF
¼ pmpndðFþRhiÞ ¼ pðF; hiÞ:
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 4
In order to simplify the calculations, throughout the proof of this proposition, we
assume that C(p) is a linear increasing function of the following form CðpÞ ¼ p
1d.
Clearly, this implies per period costs of control will be equal to p. However,
qualitative results would not change, if we assume any increasing and convex
functional form.
Proof:
1. The proof of the first part of the proposition follows straightforwardly from
Fig. 3.
2. The second part of the proposition says that a combination of policy
instruments of the form p ¼ p2ð1Þ and a = 1 would minimize the costs of
law enforcement in case the (E S) outcome has to be implemented, and hence, it
would maximize the social welfare Wðp; aÞ ¼ dDWL
1d  pðaÞ:
Indeed, recall expression (3), which says that
opðF;hi;aÞ
oa \0: This implies that
minap
ðaÞ ¼ pð1Þ: Now looking at Fig. 4, we conclude that the optimal
policy to implement (E S) sets a = 1 and p ¼ minapðaÞ ¼ p2ð1Þ (point B in
Fig. 4).
3. The third part of the proposition follows directly from Fig. 4 and from the
objective function of the antitrust authority Wðp; aÞ ¼ maxppðdDWL11d Þ: This
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implies that p ¼ 0; a 2 ½0; 1 if dDWL
1d  11d \0, and p ¼ p1 ; a 2 ½0; a if
dDWL
ð1dÞ  11d  0: h
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 5
Again, to simplify the calculations, throughout the proof of this proposition, we
assume that C(p) is a linear increasing function of the following form CðpÞ ¼ p
1d.
Clearly, this implies per period costs of control will be equal to p. However, qualitative
results would not change, if we assume any increasing and convex functional form.
Proof:
1. The proof of the first part of the proposition follows directly from Figure 3. The
social welfare in case cartel formation does not occur is given by WðNEÞðp; aÞ ¼
SDWL
ð1dÞ  p þ 0: It does not depend on a. Hence, the optimal policy to implement
(NE) would just minimize p and, hence, sets p ¼ p1 and a 2 ½0; a1:
2. The proof of the second part is based on the idea that the solution of the
maximization problem fmaxp;afdSDWL1d  p þ ð1  aÞFg s.t. VES [ VNE and
VES [ VENSg is given by the tangency point of the iso-welfare curve in case
the (E S) outcome is implemented with the lowest incentive compatibility
constraint for self-reporting to be profitable, i.e., p2
*(a). See Fig. 4.
In this situation, two cases can arise: Firstly, if at the tangency point p \ p1
**, the
welfare, in case the (E S) outcome is implemented, is given by
WðESÞðp; aÞ ¼ dSDWLð1dÞ  p þ ð1  aÞF. Hence, the slope of the iso-welfare curve
will be equal to  oWðESÞðp;aÞ=oaoWðESÞðp;aÞ=op ¼ F; implying that the tangency point is
determined by the solution of the following equation: (p2
*(a))a
0
= - F. See point A
in Fig. 4, where the dashed negatively sloped straight lines represent iso-welfare
curves.
Secondly, if at the tangency point p [ p1
**, we consider two corner solutions.
p 1*
p1 2 p
2* p
0 ** p **
α
1 
h1 > h2
α
 2*
α
 1*
A
B
C
Fig. 4 Implementation of (ES) outcome
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The first is given by p = p2
*(1) and a = 1. This is illustrated by point B in Fig. 4.
The welfare in this case is given by WðESÞðp2ð1Þ; 1Þ ¼ dSDWLð1dÞ  p2ð1Þ þ 0
The second is given by p = p1
** and a = a *, where a *:p2
* = p1
**. This is
illustrated by point C in Fig. 4. The welfare in this case is given by
WðESÞðp1 ; aÞ ¼ dSDWLð1dÞ  p1 þ ð1  aÞF:
3. The third part of the proposition follows directly from Fig. 3 and the objective
function of the antitrust authority: WðE;NÞðp; aÞ ¼ maxp;afpdSDWLð1dÞ  p1d þ p2Fg:
Then, there are only corner solutions given by p = 0 and a 2 ½0; 1 if dSDWLð1dÞ 
1
1d þ 2F\0; and by p = p1** and a 2 ½0; a if dSDWLð1dÞ  11d þ 2F  0: So, if gains to
the society from conviction are low, it is reasonable not to control at all. And vise
versa, if gains due to the savings of DWL and fines that can be collected are high, it
is desirable for the antitrust authority to impose a strictly positive rate of law
enforcement, p = p1
**.
Appendix 4: Proof of the result in the Footnote 8
In case leniency programs are present from t = 0, the two-stage game described in
Fig. 1 can be reduced to a one-stage game, where firms simultaneously choose
between three possible strategies (NE), (E, S), and (E, NS). In this simultaneous
move game, which is described in Table 2, there are no additional cartel profits
realized in the first stage. This is the main difference with the two-stage game
described in Fig. 1.
As before, we analyze the two different collusive strategy profiles (Enter Cartel
and Self-report) and (Enter Cartel and Not Self-report) and one competitive strategy
profile (Not to Enter the Cartel in the first place).
First, we consider the strategy Enter Cartel and Self-report (E, S). If the firm
decides to enter the cartel agreement and self-report, this may give pn
1d  Rh1 if the
other member of cartel stays silent, pn
1d  Rh1  ð1aÞ2 F if the other firm also reports,
or pn
1d if the other firm decides not to enter cartel agreement. The second collusive
strategy is Enter Cartel and Not Self-report (E, NS). In this case the payoff, when
the other member of the cartel also sticks to cartel agreement is determined
recursively as an expectation of the monopoly gains, pm, (if cartel is not found) and
competitive profits, pn, less the fine and losses due to asymmetric punishment effect
Table 2 Normal form of the simultaneous move stage game when LPs are present from t = 0
firm 1 firm 2
NE, - E, S E, NS
NE, - pn
1d ;
pn
1d
pn
1d ;
pn
1d
pn
1d ;
pn
1d
E, S pn
1d ;
pn
1d pn1d  Rh1  ð1aÞ2 F; pn1d  Rh2  ð1aÞ2 F
pn
1d  Rh1; pn1d  Rhi  F
E, NS pn
1d ;
pn
1d
pn
1d  Rh1  F; pn1d  Rh2 pð
pn
1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp ;
pð pn
1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp
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(if violation is discovered by the AA), i.e.,
pð pn
1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp . Further, (E, NS)
strategy will lead to pn
1d  Rh1  F if the other member of the cartel reports and pn1d
if the other firm decides not to enter the cartel agreement. The competitive strategy
profile Not to Enter the Cartel (NE, -) implies that both firms obtain competitive
profits pn forever, i.e.,
pn
1d :
Analysis of the payoffs in Table 2 reveals that the strategy (E, S) is dominated by
the strategy (NE), since the discounted sum of profits if firms collude and self-report
is always lower than the discounted sum of profits in case the cartel is not formed.
Clearly, pn
1d  Rhi  ð1aÞ2 F\ pnð1dÞ for any possible parameters values F, hi, R C 0
and a [ (0,1]. So, we can say that further solution of the game should follow the
same lines as described in Sects. 3 and 4 with the simplification that the strategy
(E, S) will not be played in equilibrium any more (for any possible parameter
values).
We now proceed to analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of infinitely repeated
game played among firms once the policy parameters and rules of leniency
programs are set at t = 0. For that, we have to compare the discounted sum of
profits if firms form a cartel and the discounted sum of profits in case the cartel is
not formed. This comparison has to be done for both cases, when firms choose to
self-report and when they prefer not to cooperate with the Antitrust Authority.
First, we consider a setting where both firms choose the strategy Enter Cartel and
Self-report, which we denote (E, S). The expected payoff from playing this strategy
for each firm includes the expected payoff from simultaneous self-reporting that is
given by VE;S ¼ pn1d  Rhi  ð1aÞ2 F.27 When no agreement about cartel formation
is reached, the discounted payoffs for both firms, evaluated at t = 1, are given by
expression VNE; ¼ pnð1dÞ.28 Collusion would arise if VES [ VNE,-. However, as
discussed above, this inequality is never true, since pn
1d  Rhi  ð1aÞ2 F\ pnð1dÞ for
all R, hi, F [ 0. Hence, we can conclude that the collusive strategy:
Enter Cartel and Self-report will never arise, since it is dominated by the
strategy: Not to Enter the Cartel for both firms. Hence, it can never arise in a SPNE.
This proves the following Lemma.
Lemma 6 For given policy parameters (F, f, p, a), a subgame perfect equilibrium
in which firms collude and self-report does not exist.
Hence, the normal form matrix game represented in Table 2 can be reduced to
the game described in Table 3.
Next, we look at the second possible outcome, where both firms choose Not to
Self-report.The expected payoff from playing this strategy is given by VE;NS ¼
pð pn
1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp : Again, when no agreement about cartel formation is reached,
the discounted payoffs for both firms are given by expression VNE; ¼ pnð1dÞ :
27 To simplify the calculations, we evaluate all the payoffs at time t = 1. So that, we discount payoffs
obtained in periods t [ 1 into the first period with discount factor 1ð1þrÞt1 ¼ d
t1:
28 See Table 2.
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Looking at the Table 3, we can conclude that there are two Nash Equilibria in pure
strategies. The strategy (NE, NE) not enter the cartel for both firms is a Nash
equilibrium of the normal form matrix game for any values of parameters of the
model. However, the collusive equilibrium, in which both firms enter the cartel and
do not self-report, can arise only if VE,NS [ VNE,-, that is, if the following condition
is satisfied:
p pm  pn
pm  pn þ F þ Rhi ¼ p
ðF; hiÞ for i ¼ 1; 2: ð9Þ
Note that when condition (9) is satisfied ((E, NS), (E, NS)) would also be Pareto-
dominant equilibrium of the matrix game in Table 3.
In order to establish when Enter and Not to Self-reportis a subgame perfect
equilibrium, we have to consider only one constraint specified in (9). In Fig. 5, this
constraint is represented by the vertical line p: Threshold pðF; hi; aÞ derived in
Sect. 3.1, which specifies the values of the rate of law enforcement p for which self-
reporting is preferred to no self-reporting, is irrelevant in this setup due to Lemma 6
and the fact that the strategy (E, S) is dominated by the strategy (NE). This threshold
is represented by the downward sloping locus p in Fig. 5. Simple calculations also
show that pðF; hiÞ\pðF; hi; aÞ for any F,hi [ 0 and for any a 2 ð0; 1: Hence, we
can conclude that the following Lemma holds.
Table 3 The normal form of the simultaneous move game after dominated strategies are deleted
firm 1 firm 2
NE, - E, NS
NE, - pn
1d ;
pn
1d
pn
1d ;
pn
1d
E, NS pn
1d ;
pn
1d pð
pn
1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp ;
pð pn
1dRhiFÞþð1pÞpm
1dþdp
Fig. 5 Incentive compatibility constraints and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria when Leniency
Programs are present from t = 0
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Lemma 7 For given policy parameters (F, f, p, a), a subgame perfect equilibrium
in which firms enter the cartel and do not self-report exists if p\pðF; hiÞ: A
subgame perfect equilibrium in which firms do not enter the cartel in the first place
exists if p [ pðF; hiÞ:
Clearly, for a high rate of law enforcement, i.e., when p [ pðF; hiÞ; the
outcome with no collusion, (NE, NE), where both firms decide to stay out of the
cartel, is a SPNE of the game. Fig. 5 illustrates the equilibrium solutions stated in
Lemma 7 for the two firm types.
End of the proof of Footnote 8
This analysis shows that the solution of the game, in case leniency programs are
present from t = 0, follows the same lines as described in Sects. 3 and 4 with the
simplification that the strategy (E, S) will not be played in equilibrium any more (for
any possible parameter values) as discussed in the Footnote 8.
Appendix 5: Comparison of leniency programs in the US and Europe
We can stress two main aspects in which the sentencing guidelines and the
applications of leniency programs differ among different countries: The timing of
introduction of leniency programs and competition law in general and Optimality
Table 4 Fining systems and structure of leniency programs
Country Size of fine Limitation of fine Number
of fine
reduct.
Max fine
reduction
first
reporter
(%)
Max fine
reduction
other
reporters
EU Base level of fine is determined
by gravity and duration
10% of total
annual turnover
of year before
conviction
[1 100 Up to 50%
US Fine is determined on the basis
of gravity, illegal gains from
offense, and damage to
society
No upper bound 1 100 No fine
reduction
UK Seriousness and relevant
turnover form a basis
10% of total UK
turnover of year
before
conviction
[1 100 50%
NL A base fine of 10% of the
estimated illegal gains
10% of total
annual turnover
of year before
conviction
[1 100 40%
Germany Seriousness and duration form
a basis
10% of total
annual turnover
of year before
conviction
[1 100 50%
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considerations such as the size of the fine and the number of reductions. These
results are summarized in the Tables 4 and 5 below. Sources: EC (2006a, b), NMa
(2007), DOJ (1993), DOJ (2008), OECD (2002).
An example of a fining decision29
The determination of the fine by the Commission for the European part of the
graphite electrode cartel, UCAR International, is described in Table 6 (this figure is
adopted from Wehmhoerner 2005). The nature of the infringement was deemed to
be very serious, because UCAR had engaged in market-sharing and price-fixing
practices, which were implemented with full knowledge of the illegality of the
actions. In considering the actual impact of the infringement, the decision notes that
during the time of the cartel agreement, prices nearly doubled. Moreover, the
producers represented almost 90% of the worldwide market, and the prices were not
only agreed but also announced and implemented. Hence, the amount of the fine
according to gravity for the two main producers, UCAR and SGL, was selected to
be 40 million euro.
Aggravating factors included UCAR’s role as one of the ringleaders and
instigators of the cartel and the continuation of the infringement after the
Table 5 Timing of introduction of competition law and leniency programs
General competition law Leniency program
Country First initiative Organization in charge LP introduction LP latest revision
EU 1959 Commission 1996 2006
US 1890 DoJ 1978 1997
UK 1998 Office of Fair Trading 1998 2004
Netherlands 1998 Nma 2002 2007
Germany 1958 Bundeskartellamt 2002 2006
Table 6 Determination of the fine for UCAR according to the EC guidelines
Fine after each stage in
mil. €
Base fine
40 Gravity: very serious infringement
62 Duration: 5 years and 9 months, implying an increase of 55% of the amount
determined according to gravity and result in a base fine of € 62 million.
Individual fine
99.2 Aggravating factors imply an increase of 60% of the base fine
84.1 Reduction of fine due to the max limit of fines (10% of overall turnover)
50.4 40% reduction due to application of leniency policy
50.4 Total fine
29 This example is adopted from Wehmhoerner (2005).
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investigation started. Although UCAR was not the first company that provided the
Commission with decisive evidence, it contributed substantially to establishing
important aspects of the case and the Commission, therefore, granted a reduction of
40% of the fine.
To provide an overview of the fining method behind the US guidelines, the
application of the guidelines in the determination of the fine for the US part of the
graphite electrode cartel, UCAR International, is described in Table 7 (this figure is
adopted from Wehmhoerner 2005). UCAR was accused of price-fixing in the US
from 1992 to 1997. The memorandum was filed in April 1998 by the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The fining range is determined by calculating 20% of the volume of affected
commerce over the entire duration as a starting fine. Subsequently, for each factor,
such as the size of the undertaking in terms of the number of employees, the
corresponding points with which to increase or decrease the culpability score can be
read from the guidelines. There is a direct quantitative link between these factors
and the fining range through the use of the culpability score, which determines the
fining range. However, neither the guidelines nor the decision explain how the
alternative fine should be determined in case of inability to pay.
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